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LAND AND WATER
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME V

1970

NUMBER 2

This is the first of a two part article on the scope of public and
private rights in navigable waters under federal and state law. This
first part deals with the federal sources of public and private rights in
navigable waters and the second part will consider the scope of these
rights under state law. Although volumes of books could easily be
written on these subjects, Professor Leighty has succinctly defined
and offered penetrating observations into the problems and possible
solutions.

THE SOURCE AND SCOPE OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
NAVIGABLE WATERS
Leighton L. Leighty*

T

article is published in two parts in this review. This
first part will cover the source or origin of public and
private rights in navigable waters. Since it may be fairly
stated that most of these rights are determined under relevant state law,' and since the impact of federal law on these
rights is usually by way of limitation, it seems appropriate
to handle federal controls first. Moreover, many of these
rights have had their origin in the federal test for navigability and in the transfer of sovereignty from the federal
government to the respective states upon their admission to
the union.
His

Professor of Natural Resource Law, Department of Resource
*Assistant
Development, Michigan State University; B.A., 1964, Graceland College;
J.D., 1967, Washington University (St. Louis); L.L.M., 1968, University
of Wisconsin; Member of Misouri and Michigan Bar Associations; Law
Fellow, University of Wisconsin 1967-1968. Professor Leighty has participated in environmental litigation.
1. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); see United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950) (exception made when paramount federal rights asserted in
narginal sea) ; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935). But see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963).
Outside the problem of federal projects and programs which are
naturally paramount and have a significant limiting impact on rights unCopyright@ 1970 by the University of Wyoming
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The second part of this article will deal with the scope
of public and private rights under state law. As an early
United States Supreme Court case indicated,2 the rights in
navigable waters vary so greatly from state to state, despite
the fact that "trends" may be indicated,' that one must be
extremely cautious in using cases from other jurisdictions.
Precedents in other jurisdictions are particularly deceptive
because they appear to be dealing with identical subject matter and employ similar language (or may even perfunctorily
quote from cases in other states),' but frequently they are
dealing with a peculiarly local matter5 and may fail to cite
(much less distinguish) a prior inconsistent case in that same
jurisdiction.!

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

der state law via the supremacy clause, perhaps the only major impingement on state law is the question of title to the beds of navigable waters.
See United States v. Texas, supra; United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v.
Oregon, supra; United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States
v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v.
United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Johnson v. Seifert, 257 Minn. 159, 100
N.W.2d 689 (1960); Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.
(1964). Moreover, it appears that the federal test of navigability controls
only when some property claim is made under federal authority.
Compare Shively v. Bowlby, supra with United States v. Utah, supra,
and United States v. Holt State Bank, supra.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
E.g., Johnson, Riparian and Public Rights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WASH.
L. REv. 58D, 605 (1960).
See, e.g., Attorney General ex rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 306 Mich. 432,
11 N.W.2d 193 (1943); Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115
(1926); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937).
See, e.g., County Bd. of Supervisors of Mecosta County v. Department of
Conservation, 381 Mich. 180, 160 N.W.2d 909 (1968) (statutory lake level
proceeding). The limited nature of the local issue before the court ruling
on the issue of navigability may not even be apparent to courts in the same
jurisdiction. Compare Pigorsh v. Fahner, __ Mich App.
- _, N.W.2d
-_, Civil No. 5602 (Ct. App. Mich. February 25, 1970) with County Bd.
of Mecosta County v. Department of Conservation, supra. Beyond the
pleasure-versus-commerce dichotomy, there may even be distinctions between different types of "commerce." For example, there may be a "manifest difference between public streams that can be used successfully for
the running of boats and vessels for the purpose of commerce, and those
which are only capable of being used for the floatage of lumber and
logs ..... " City of Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 111, 50 N.W. 661,
666 (1891).
See, e.g., Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488
(1949). No attempt was made to distinguish a prior case using an inconsistent test for navigability. See Roberts v. Taylor, 74 N.D. 146, 181 N.W.
622 (1921). Compare Johnson v. Seifert, supra note 1; State v. Adams, 251
Minn. 521, 89 N.W.2d 661 (1957); County of Becker v. Shevlin Land Co.,
186 Minn. 401, 243 N.W. 433 (1932). For a comprehensive study of the
development of the test of navigability in one jurisdiction see Bartke, Navigability in Michigan in Retrospect and Prospect (1970) (unpublished manuscript on file at Wayne State University Law School). This manuscript will
appear in May of 1970 at 16 WAYNE L. REV. -_ (No. 2) (1970) and was
graciously loaned to this author while this article was being written. See
also Munro, Public v. Private: The Status of Lakes 10 BUFFALO L. Ruv. 459

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/5

2

Leighty: The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Wa

1970

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS

393

Throughout this article an attempt will be made to reach
a meaningful and workable definition of navigability in the
context of specific issues. Some states may be found which
have more than one definition of navigability depending on
the issue to be decided.' An important question to keep in
mind is whether "navigability" is so inherently unworkable
that it can no longer be employed as a meaningful standard
under which public and private rights are determined. In
this context, the second part of this article will develop the
legislative enactments which have attempted to define navigability. Nonetheless, "navigability" has strong roots in
the common law of England and this country as the criteria
for determining public and private rights:
The division of waters into navigable and nonnavigable is but a way of dividing them into public and
private waters,- a classification which, in some
form, every civilized nation has recognized; the line
of division being largely determined by its conditions and habits. In early times, about the only
use-except, perhaps, fishing-to which the people
of England had occasion to put public waters, and
about the only use to which such waters were adapted, was navigation, and the only waters suited to
that purpose were those in which the tide ebbed
and flowed. Hence, the common law very naturally
divided waters into navigable and nonnavigable,
and made the ebb and flow of the tide the test of
navigability. In this country, while still retaining
the common-law classification of navigable and nonnavigable, we have, in view of our changed conditions, rejected its test of navigability, and adopted
in its place that of navigability in fact; and, while
still adhering to navigability as the criterion whether
waters are public or private, yet we have extended
the meaning of that term so as to declare all waters
public highways which afford a channel for any useful commerce, including small streams, merely float(1961). State courts frequently confuse prior cases dealing with bed title
with prior cases concerning surface use. See, e.g., Kemp v. Putnam, 47
Wash. 2d 530, 288 P.2d 837 (1955).
7. This is apparently one of the problems in Michigan. Depending on the
specific issue before the court, the test of navigability may change, and
these multiple tests for navigability have produced no small amount of
confusion. See Bartke, supra note 6. For subsequent development of both
the confusion and the tests see Pigorsh v. Fahner, supra note 5.
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able for logs at certain seasons of the year. Most of
the definitions of "navigability" in the decided
cases, while perhaps conceding that the size of the
boats or vessels is not important, and, indeed, that
it is not necessary that navigation should be by boats
at all, yet seem to convey the idea that the water
must be capable of some commerce of pecuniary
value, as distinguished from boating for mere pleasure. But if, under present conditions of society,
bodies of water are used for public uses other than
mere commercial navigation, in its ordinary sense,
we fail to see why they ought not to be held to be public waters, or navigable waters, if the old nomenclature is preferred. Certainly, we do not see why
boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as boating for mere pecuniary profit. Many, if not the most, of the meandered
lakes of this state, are not adapted to, and probably
will never be used to any great extent for, commercial navigation; but they are used-and as population increases, and towns and cities are built up in
their vicinity, will be still more used-by the people
for sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water for domestic, agricultural, and even
city purposes, cutting ice, and other public purposes
which cannot now be enumerated or even anticipated. To hand over all these lakes to private ownership, under any old or narrow test of navigability,
would be a great wrong upon the public for all time,
the extent of which cannot, perhaps, be now even anticipated!
While the source of public and private water rights in
navigable waters is a matter of historical development, a
description of the scope of these rights could exhaust the
pages of several volumes. Hence, a manageable approach9 to
8. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 52 Minn. 181, 199, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893).
9. An alternate approach might be to start with the hypothetical situation of
plenary private control of navigable waters. The discussion would then be
directed toward carving away layers of "rights" in favor of federal and
state constraints. This approach, however, is so far removed from the development of Anglo-American legal history concerning sovereignty that it
would have little utility. In fact, from the federal perspective, private
control may be restricted to a narrow set of usufructuary interests with no
true ownership in the proprietary sense. In United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913), the Court indicated
that private ownership in a great navigable stream is inconceivable. In like
manner, United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510
(1945) , indicates:
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the extent of private rights in navigable waters is first to de-

lineate the scope of public rights in these waters and then to
attribute the remainder of the bundle I" of water rights to

private control.

Of course, a demarcation of public rights

in nonnavigable lakes and streams will also be required. This
approach appears to be sound for three reasons. First, private rights in water (whether navigable or otherwise) have
been adequately refined in hundreds of articles and in several
excellent treatises on the ramifications of the riparian and
appropriation doctrines.1 Second, a review of the relevant
cases seems to indicate that the legal principles which control
the extent of public rights in navigable and nonnavigable

waters have developed independently, without regard to
which system of law governs private water rights in a given

jurisdiction.

This pattern appears to emerge in riparian

states, in appropriation states, and in states which have a
combination of these doctrines. 2 Third, the distinctions
Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the world
are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them. Whatever
rights may be as between equals such as riparian owners, they are not
the measure of riparian rights on a navigable stream relative to the
function of the Government in improving navigation. Where these
interests conflict they are not to be reconciled as between equals, but
the private interest must give way to a superior right, or perhaps it
would be more accurate to say that as against the Government such
private interest is not a right at all.
10. This is analogous to the traditional concept of a "bundle-of-sticks" in the
law of real property. The "bundle" as described in this article is composed
of federal powers exercised under the supremacy clause, federal proprietary interests, state proprietary interests, state exercises of internal
sovereignty, public rights to surface use, private controls over surface use,
and private proprietary interests. In the order just stated, each of these
elements carved out of a theoretically absolute bundle of water rights is
(roughly speaking) subject to all preceeding elements. Private rights in
navigable waters are, therefore, the most limited.
11. See, e.g., 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 15-29 (Clark ed. 1967). See
aleo THE

LAW OF WATER

ALLOCATION

IN

THE

EASTERN UNITED

STATES

(Haber & Bergen eds. 1958); UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL LEGISLATIvE RESEARCH CENTER, WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW (1958); FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1904); GOULD, LAW OF
WATERS (2d ed. 1891); ANGELL, THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES (7th ed. 1877).
Two other major theories of water law are worth mentioning, in addition
to the familiar California doctrine.
One is res communes which is
the original source of the problems developed in this article and which can
be traced to Roman civil law. See SAX, WATER LAW-CASES AND COMMENTARY 7 (1965). The other may be called the "law of necessity" because it
operates in a given jurisdiction in spite of the applicable riparian or appropriation theory when imperative "needs" are manifest. See SAX, supra
at 75-88, 368-72; Garrity & Nitzchke, Survey of Water Law, 6 LAW NOTES
7, 8 (1969).
12. Compare, e.g., Duval v. Thomas, 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959); Kerley v.
Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957) (lakes); Attorney General
ex rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, 306 Mich. 432, 11 N.W.2d 193 (1943)
(streams); Johnson v. Seifert, supra note 1; Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wash.2d
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between public and private rights at common law frequently
began by first describing the extent of rights available to the
public. Jus privatum was always subject to jus publicum.
As Chief Justice Shaw said in an early Massachusetts case,
jus publicum is the royal prerogative:
by which the king holds such shores and navigable
rivers, for the common use and benefit of all the subjects, and indeed of all persons of all nations at
peace with England, who may have occasion to use
them for the purposes of trade. This royal right or
jus pub licum, is held by the crown in trust for such
common use and benefit and cannot be transferred
to a subject, or alienated, limited, or restrained, by
the mere royal grant, without an act of parliament.
The King's Grant, therefore, although it may vest
the right of soil in a subject, will not justify the
grantee in erecting such permanent structures thereon, as to disturb the common rights of navigation;
and such obstruction, not withstanding such grants,
held to be a public or private nuisance as the case
may be.' 8
Another point that emerges from the cases dealing with
navigable waters is a distinction between those areas in which
public and private rights are governed by federal law and
those in which state law controls. This point became important in organizing this article. Since most conflicts between
public and private rights are determined by relevant state
rules, with the notable exception of the issue of ownership
of title to beds of navigable waters, 4 a discussion of state
law becomes meaningful under the heading of the scope of
these rights. Moreover, state control over navigable waters
had its origin in the transfer of territorial sovereignty from
the federal government to the respective states 5 upon their
admission to the union. 6 By contrast, federal law appears
in most cases, as a result of some paramount national in815, 296 P.2d 1015 (1956) (lakes); Strand v. State, 16 Wash.2d 107, 132
P.2d 1011 (1943) (streams); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
13. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 90 (1851).
See also
United States v. Willow River Power Co., supra note 9.
14. United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1.
15. Special exceptions exist with respect to Texas and to the original 13
colonies. See notes 67-72 infra and accompanying text.
16. See United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1; Shively v. Bowlby,
supra note 2.
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terest, by way of limitation on both public and private rights

under state law. Thus it seems appropriate to discuss federal controls over navigable waters in the context of the origin

or source of rights in these waters and to defer discussion
of the varying state rules to the second half of this article.
I. SOURCES OF PUBLIC RIGHTS IN NAVIGABLE WATERS

"Navigability" or "navigable waters" is the touchstone
for determining many sovereign, private, and public rights
in waters.1 7 A significant problem is the matter of defining
"navigability." More precisely, the problem is that of clearly delineating navigability for the specific purpose at hand
and distinguishing that test of navigability from other tests
employed in varying contexts.
Navigability has meaning only with respect to the factual
issue before the court. Under English common law the test
of navigability related solely to the existence of the ebbing
and flowing of the tide."8 This test covered most of the major
rivers in England but excluded most of the inland lakes and
streams in this country." Hence, the federal criteria for
navigability and most state tests have adopted some form
of the navigable-in-fact rule."0 Despite these variations,
meaningful differences can be made only with respect to the
purpose for which navigability is used as the standard.
Thus, navigability may be used to determine: title to beds of
lakes and streams for federal purposes,2 ' title to these beds
for state purposes,2 2 the validity of various federal statutes
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Although the English rule
is. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (!ED!).
has nearly vanished from American jurisprudence, some early cases
measured navigability with this standard. For example, the issue of bed
title was determined by the ebb and flow test:
"All the cases in which waters above the ebb and flow of the tide, such
as great inland lakes and the larger rivers of the country, are held
to be public in any other sense than as being subjected to a servitude
to the public for the purposes of navigation, are confessedly a departure from the common law." Id. at 395.
19. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2, at 32.
20. E.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
21. E.g., United States v. Utah, supra note 1; United States v. Holt State
Bank, supra note 1.
22. See, e.g., State v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908); Obrecht v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 361 Mich. 399, 105 N.W.2d 143 (1960); Nedtweg v.
Wallace, 237 Mich. 14, 208 N.W. 51 (1926); State v. Longyear Holding Co.,
224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W.2d 657 (1947); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E.
400 (1895); Pacific Milling & Elevator Co. v. Portland, 65 Ore. 349, 133
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and the legitimate scope of authority of Congress with respect to water under specific express and implied powers
within the federal constitution," the extent of public rights
to surface use under state law when the beds are privately
owned,"4 the correlative rights of surface use by riparians
when the bed is privately owned,"5 the right of access to the
water by both the general public and by private riparians,"6
specific rights under specific state statutes that may or may
not otherwise be limited by the navigability of the water in
question. 7 Moreover, differences may appear in the context
of whether the body of water in question is characterized as
a lake or as a stream. Therefore, the first section of this
article related to the source of rights will describe those purposes and factual issues which are controlled by federal rules
or legislation.
A. The Federal Test of Navigability
The initial consideration is the federal test that is used
to determine the "navigable waters of the United States."

23.
24.
25.

26.

27.

P. 72 (1913); Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927).
There is a substantial body of authority to the effect that once state
ownership is determined under the federal test, as indicated by the authorities cited note 21 supra, disposition of that title is purely a matter of
state law. See United States v. Texas, supra note 1 (implication with respect to inland waters) ; Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2; Hardin v. Jordan,
supra note 18; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
See also Port of
Seattle v. Oregon & W.R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921).
E.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
E.g., Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); Day v. Armstrong, supra note 12.
E.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W. 129 (1955); Duval v.
Thomas, supra note 12; Kerley v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748
(1957); Johnson v. Seifert, supra note 1; Snively v. Jaber supra note 12.
See also Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667, 154 N.W.2d 473 (1967) (rights
in artificially created watercourse).
E.g., Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 90 Pac. 532 (1907) ; Driesbach
v. Lynch, 71 Idaho 501, 234 P.2d 446 (1951); McGlone v. Maynard, 303 Ky.
415, 197 S.W.2d 918 (1946); Lundberg v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 231 Wis.
187, 282 N.W. 70 (1938) [explanatory memorandum at 285 N.W. 839
(1939)]. See also Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REV. 335.
For example, riparian bank rights may be affected. LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 455 (West 1952):
The use of the banks of navigable rivers or streams is public; accordingly every one has a right freely to bring his vessels to land there,
to make fast the same to the trees . . . to unload his vessels, to deposit his goods, to dry his nets, and the like.
Nevertheless the ownership of the river banks belongs to those
who possess the adjacent lands.
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The basic test is described in the classic case handed down
by the United States Supreme Court in 1870 in The Daniel
Ball:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they
are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition,
as highways for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water. And they consitute navigable waters of the United States ... in
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the
States, when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may
be carried on with other states or foreign countries
in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by water.2"
This basic test has been embellished and expanded over the
years:
The true test of navigability of a stream does not
depend on the mode by which commerce is, or may be
conducted, nor the difficulties attending navigation. . . . The capability of use by the public for
purposes of transportation and commerce affords
the true criteria of the navigability of a river, rather
than the extent and manner of that use.. .. It is not
every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which
is navigable, but in order to give it the character of a
navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculure. .
28. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
29. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).
For a complete development of the federal test, these basic cases should be considered:
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Grand
River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United States v. Willow
River Power Co., supra note 9; United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., supra note 23; United States v. Oregon, supra note 1; United States
v. Utah, supra note 1; United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1;
Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, supra note 1; Oklahoma v.
Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States,
256 U.S. 113 (1921); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); Packer v. Bird,
137 U.S. 661 (1891); Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884); The Montello,
supra; The Daniel Ball, supra note 20. See also Guinn, An Analysis of
Navigable Waters of the United States, 18 BAYLoR L. ReV. 559 (1966).
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However, the fully developed and most expansive statement
of the federal test for navigability is given in United States
v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. :30
The legal concept of navigability embraces both public and private interests. It is not to be determined
by a formula which fits every type of stream under
all circumstances and at all times, our past decisions
have taken due account of the changes and complexities in the circumstances of a river. We do not purport now to lay down any single definitive test. We
draw from the prior decisions in this field and apply them ... to the particular circumstances presented by the New River...."
To appraise the evidence of navigability on the
natural condition only of the waterway is erroneous.
Its availability for navigation must also be considered. "Natural and ordinary condition" refers to
volume of water, the gradients, and the regularity
of the flow. A waterway, otherwise suitable for
navigation, is not barred from that classification
merely because artificial aids must make the highway suitable for use before commercial navigation
may be undertaken. [T]here are obvious limits to
such improvements as affecting navigability. These
limits are necessarily a matter of degree. There
must be a balance between cost and need at a time
when the improvement would be useful. When once
found to be navigable, a waterway remains so. Nor
is it necessary that the improvements should be actually completed or even authorized. The power of
Congress over commerce is not to be hampered because of the necessity for reasonable improvements
to make an interstate waterway available for traffic.
Of course there are difficulties in applying these
views. Improvements that may be entirely reasonable in a thickly populated, highly developed, industrial region may have been entirely too costly for the
same region in the days of the pioneers. Although
navigability to fix ownership of the river bed or riparian rights is determined . . . as of the formation
of the Union in the original states or the admission
30. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
31. Id. at 404

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/5

10

Leighty: The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Wa

1970

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS

to statehood of those formed later, navigability, for
the purpose of the regulation of commerce, may later
arise. An analogy is found in admiralty jurisdiction,
which may be extended over places formerly nonnavigable. There has never been doubt that the
navigability referred to in the cases was navigability
despite the obstruction of falls, rapids, sand bars,
carries or shifting currents. The plenary federal
power over commerce must be able to develop with
the needs of that commerce which is the reason for
its existence.
82
This passage from the case succinctly states much of what
is to be discussed in the first half of this article. Individual
sentences either summarize whole areas of federal involvement in public and private rights in navigable waters under
state law or provide the origin for confusion as to the extent
of the limitations imposed on these rights when state and federal tests for navigability conflict.
B. Applying the Federal Test
The exercise of any control over navigable waters by the
federal government and any limitations imposed on any public or private rights therein must arise under the express or
implied powers of the federal constitution or under laws or
treaties made under the authority of the federal constitution.
Hence, in the event of a conflict with state regulations for
navigable waters or rights in navigable waters created by
state law, the federal exercise of power (including the federal
test of navigability, when that is an issue) will prevail."
ThL.-Ue s
veProvisions of the fe+deral constitution under
which navigability may become an issue are the treaty power,
the war power, admiralty jurisdiction, the general welfare
clause, the property clause, and the commerce clause.
i

1. The Treaty and War Powers.
The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
32. Id. at 407-09.
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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thirds of the Senators present concur. "" This particular
constitutional provision has rarely involved the issue of
navigability."
However, when the issue is raised it is important to remember that the federal rather than the state
test of navigability controls. For example, in Oklahoma v.
Texas, 6 the Court specifically adopts the test used in The
Daniel Ball." Thus only those segments of the Red River
and Arkansas River which are navigable in fact are navigable
in law. Interestingly it was the states themselves in this case
that attempted to invoke a federal treaty which would have
made the entire lengths of these rivers navigable and hence
under state control. The Court instead employed the usual
federal test of navigability.
Similarly, the war power8" has only infrequently appeared in the same context with the issue of navigability.
Given a sufficient state of emergency, the exercise of the war
power could perhaps absorb all rights related to navigable
waters. However, in actual cases the war power has normally
been employed to legitimize an expansion of federal authority
only in conjunction with other express constitutional provisions. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,8 authority for the development of navigable waters and related
activities was justified on the basis of both the war and commerce powers. Wilson Dam was constructed under these express powers for the purposes of national defense (the production of munitions) and the improvement of navigation.
In United States v. California" the war power was combined
with the treaty power and with federal control over commerce
(both foreign and interstate) and international affairs to
raise the implication that the United States has "paramount
rights" in the navigable waters within the territorial boundaries of the various states." As a result of the Tideland
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
35. For an exhaustive discussion of the treaty power in this context see
Laurent, Judicial Criteria of Navigability in Federal Cases, 1953 Wis. L.
REV. 8.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

258 U.S. 574 (1922).
Id. at 586.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
332 U.S. 19 (1947).
Id. at 34-36; accord United States v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 704. The
question of whether these paramount national interests extend to nontidal
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Cases,4 2 the states lost at least the ownership of submerged
lands under the marginal seas. The Court in United States
v. Texas" indicated that dominium (proprietary control in
the context of ownership of title) and imperium (sovereign
control in the context of authority to regulate), though normally separable and separate, are virtually inseparable. At
least for purposes of the marginal seas, the Court declared:
"property is so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as
to follow sovereignty.""
waters, particularly the Great Lakes and inland navigable waterways, has
not been directly answered by the United States Supreme Court. However,
a definitive statement in favor of state ownership and control was made by
Congress in the Federal Submerged Lands Act. 67 STAT. 29 (1953), 43
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1964). Nonetheless, prior to this enactment many noncoastal states had grave concern with respect to the scope of this new jurisdictional limitation. For example, Nicholas Olds, Assistant Attorney
General for the State of Michigan, frequently stated during this period of
uncertainty that the beds of the Great Lakes within Michigan's boundaries
were in danger of falling into the hands of the federal bureaucracy. See
generally Submerged Lands Hearing before Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 2 U.S. CODE, CONG. & ADM.
NEWS 1395 (1953). Moreover, there is language in United States v. California, supra, which creates some ambiguity with respect to this issue:
The belief that local interests are so predominant as constitutionally
to require state dominion over lands under its land-locked navigable
waters finds some argument for its support. But such can hardly
be said in favor of state control over any part of the ocean or the
ocean's bottom ....
Id. at 34.
See also, Hyder, United States v. California, 19 Miss. L. J. 265 (1948).
The extent of the authority to regulate navigable waters given by the
Federal Submerged Lands Act to the respective states remains an open
question. However, it seems safe to assume that the states have broad
areas of control over these waters, subject only to the supremacy clause in
the event of a direct conflict with a federal regulation. Compare 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1311 (a), 1301 (a) with Skiriotes v. Florida, supra note 1.
42. The three specific cases normally referred to as the Tideland Cases are:
United States v. Texas, supra note 1; United States v. Louisiana, supra
note 1; United States v. California, supra note 1.
These cases are thoroughly discussed in a symposium in 3 BAYLOR L.
REv. 115-266 (1951) entitled: Submerged Lands: A Case Study in Federal
Po....... Q Poundt ritiT nn. the Texas Tidelands Case. 3 BAYLOR L. REV.
120 (1951); Moore, Expropriation of the Texas "Tidelands" By Judicial
Fiat, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 130 (1951); Hyde, The International Law of the
Texas Tidelands Case, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 172 (1951); Graves, The Conduct
of the Litigation in United States v. Texas, 3 BAYLOR L. ReV. 188 (1951) ;
Hanna, The Submerged Lands Cases, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 201 (1951); Daniel,
Sovereignty and Ownership in the Marginal Sea, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 441
(1951).
See also Comment, Constitutional LawRelation of Federal
and State Governments-Title of United States to Tidelands, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 114 (1951).
For a discussion of current issues with respect to these submerged
lands see Shalowitz, Boundary Problems Raised by the Submerged Lands
Act, 54. COLUM. L. Rev. 1021 (1954); Note, The Seaward Extension of
States; A Boundary for New Jersey Under the Submerged Lands Act, 40
TEMP. L. Q. 66 (1966).
43. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
44. Id. at 719. An excellent discussion of the fallacies of the Texas case has
been written by Dean Roscoe Pound. See Pound, supra note 42.
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2. Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction.
Beyond the major commercial shipping activities and
related supporting services that are subject to some form of
federal regulation, public recreational water uses and private
riparian interests may also be subject to some federal controls. Here our concern is only the source of those controls.
Article III, Section 2, of the United States Constitution extends the federal judicial power "to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." Nearly all the cases that have
been subject to this jurisdiction have involved tort litigations
rather than conflicts concerning rights to surface use of
navigable waters."5 Nonetheless, there is reason to believe
that the admiralty jurisdiction may be extended by federal
legislation to affect rights in navigable waters."
In the last
two decades major growth patterns have emerged in waterbased outdoor recreation, particularly in the field of motorpowered pleasure craft. These patterns are expected to expand rapidly in the near future.4 7 The potential conflicts
between commercial and noncommercial users and between
45. See Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 BUFFALO L. REV. 427
(1961); Note, Pleasure Boating and the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 STAN.
L. REV. 724 (1958).
46. At least when the waters form part of an interstate waterway there
seems to be a sound basis for this conclusion. For example, if negligent
activity related to the recreational uses of the waterway create navigational hazards, federal controls such as use zones may be required. Similarly, the danger of a gasoline explosion on a small pleasure craft and the
possibility of a chain-reaction destruction of nearby ships might foster
federal legislation. See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943). For a
brief overview of federal involvement in navigable inland waters and the
impact of recreation activities on these waters see UNITED STATES WATER
RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES ch. 6-7 (part 4)
(1968). Moreover, legislation to implement the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction has a constitutional base separate and distinct from the power
over interstate commerce. See Dragon v. United States, 76 F.2d 561, 563
(5th Cir. 1935).
47.

U.S. OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMM'N. OuTDooR RECREATION
FOR AMERICA, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 221 (1962).

For example, in a recent Michigan study it was found that "sales of outboard motors increased at five times the rate of population increase in the
past 25 years." MICH. DEPT. OF CONSERVATION, MICHIGAN'S RECREATION
FUTURE 13 (Sept. 1966). For an extensive study of many of the problems
of recreational boating as a water use in the Great Lakes region see MICH.
DEPT. OF CONSERVATION, WATERWAYS DIVISION TRANSPORTATION PREDICTIVE
PROCEDURES--RECREATIONAL BOATING AND COMMERCIAL SHIPPING (Technical

Report No. 9C) (December 1966). See also Waite, supra note 45; Reis,
Policy and Planning for Recreational Use of Inland Waters, 40 TEM. L. Q.
155 (1967); Note, Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1964).

There were approximately 8,074,000 recorded pleasure craft in use in
the United States in 1966. Predictions for the year 2020, based on current trends, have reached the 30 million mark. UNITED
RESOURCES COUNCIL, supra note 46 at 4-5-8, 4-5-9.
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public and private recreational interests are therefore obvious. 8 In light of the magnitude of this business activity
(both the manufacture and distribution of boating equipment) and its impact on interstate commerce, a sound prediction might include further federal regulation of these activities under the auspices of admiralty jurisdiction standing
alone, the commerce clause discussed below, or some combination thereof.
Historically, admiralty jurisdiction was created under
English law to handle problems of the high seas.49 Early
American cases adopted this concept by limiting admiralty
jurisdiction to navigation problems in waters subject to the
ebb and flow of the tides."0 This narrow jurisdictional rule
was soon replaced by the Supreme Court in The Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugk:51 "The jurisdiction is here made
to depend upon the navigable character of the water, and not
upon the ebb and flow of the tide. If the water was navigable,
it was deemed to be public; and if public, was regarded as
within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution." 5 ' This rule was subsequently
extended to man-made waterways by the Supreme Court in
Ex Parte Boyer:5
Navigable water situated as this canal is, used for the
purposes for which it is used, a highway for commerce between ports and places in different states
.. is public water of the United States, and within
the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution and statutes of the
United States, even though the canal is wholly artificial, and is wholly within the body of a State ...
48. One solution to these conflicts may be the zoning of surface watersbased on both the time of use and the area of use. See Waite, supra
note 45 at 429-30, 443-47. Enabling legislation at the state level already
exists. E.g., MICH. COMI. LAws ANN. §§ 281.1001-.1017 (Supp. 1969)
(Marine Safety Act).
49. See Waite, Admiralty Jurisdictionand State Waters, 11 MICH. L. REv. 580
(1913).
50. See The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
51. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
52. Id. at 457
53. 109 U.S. 629 (1884).
See also Laurent, supra note 35 at 21-23.
54. Ex parte Boyer, supra note 53, at 632. This canal was wholly within the
state of Illinois.
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But the rule has not been extended to bodies of water upon
which all maritime transactions, as a result of geographical
limitations, must originate and terminate in a single state.5
However, outside this latter exception, the federal test of
navigability for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction is essentially the same as the test developed in The Daniel Ball and
Appalachian Elec. Power Co. cases. As indicated above in
the extensive passage from the Applachian case (which
was a commerce clause case), obstructions in the waterway
(which may require reasonable, artificial improvements to
create navigability-in-fact) have never prevented admiralty
jurisdiction from attaching. Hence the federal test for
navigable waters in admiralty cases is virtually the same test
as the one employed in commerce clause cases."
3. The General Welfare Clause.
The General Welfare Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, is another potential source of
federal authority under which federal standards may be applied to public and private rights in "navigable waters":
"Thus the power of Congress to promote the general welfare
through large-scale projects for reclamation, irrigation, or
other internal improvement, is now as clear and ample as is
its power to accomplish the same results indirectly through
resort to strained interpretation of the power over naviga55.

See The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 28 (1903) ; Ex parte Boyer, supra
note 53, at 632; Stapp v. Steamboat Clyde, 43 Minn. 192, 45 N.W. 430
(1890). See also Waite, supra note 49.
56. For a comprehensive study of this point see Guinn, supra note 29.
It appears that at least one court, the Fifth Circuit, has attempted
to make a clear distinction between the navigability tests used in admiralty
cases and commerce clause cases:
Appellants, to support their view that the Franicovich Canal is
not a navigable water to which the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction extends, rely on . . . United States v. Doughton (C.C.A.), 62
F.(2d) 936; Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 . .. United States v.
President, etc., of Jamaica (C.C.A.) 204 F. 759. These cases are
concerned not with admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, but with the
power of Congress over public waters susceptible of being used as
highways for interstate or foreign commerce.
The argument that
they measure the limits of admiralty jurisdiction "is a complete misconception of what the admiralty jurisdiction is under the Constitution
of the United States. Its jurisdiction is not limited to transportation
of goods and passengers from one state to another . . . but depends
upon the jurisdiction conferred in article 3, § 2, extending the judicial
power of the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."
Dragon v. United States, supra note 46, at 563.
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tion."" The cases have arisen largely in the context of reclamation projects, a context which does not necessarilyhave
anything to do with the navigable waters of the United
States."5 However, the implication seems clear that if statecreated recreational programs or other rights in navigable
waters conflict with federal programs, the latter programs
will prevail. 9
4. The Property Clause.
The property clause of the federal constitution is found
in Article IV, Section 3: "The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States. .. ." This power, when exercised, is absolute and
plenary"° and it has had an impact on rights in navigable
waters in at least three areas. Hence the following questions
need to be raised: (1) What rights were created by federal
territorial legislation and by federal land grants? (2) What
operative legal consequences resulted from the federal terri57. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950). Dean
Trelease has suggested how far this interpretation has been strained.
Federal jurisdiction over navigable waters depends upon a rather attenuated construction of Article I, § 8, of the Constitution, giving
Congress the power to "regulate commerce . . . among the several
States." Although the Supreme Court itself has termed its constructions "strained" and "highly fictional," commerce has been held to
include transportation, which in turn includes navigation; the power
to regulate navigation comprehends the control of navigable waters
for the purposes of improving navigation; this power to control includes the power to destroy the navigable capacity by damming the
waters to protect adjacent lands from flood. The power to obstruct
leads to the power to generate electrical energy from the dammed
water. Congress can protect the navigable capacity of water by preventing diversions or obbtrucLious, and the yw-w-er to prevent obatruction leads on to powers to license obstructions. Congress need recognize no rights of private persons in or to navigable waters; any such
rights are subject to a dominant servitude that the United States may
impose to destroy the right without compensation.
These national powers are broad indeed, and it imposes little added
strain to read into them the power to distribute the waters of the
destroyed river to those persons and to those states the United States
may designate ...
Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to
People, States, and Nation, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 158, 177-78.
58. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). See also
Sax, Problems of Federalism in Reclamation Law, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 49
(1964).
59. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (broad administrative
powers of the Secretary of Interior upheld).
60. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272 (1954).
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tories achieving statehood? (3) What is the significance
of the Submerged Lands Act?61
A. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Under international law territory is normally acquired
by conquest, by discovery and claim, or by specific cession. 2
Governmental control over territory then has two aspects,
depending on the mode of acquisition. These two aspects
are imperium and dominium. Imporium refers to political
authority or "sovereignty" in the true sense of the word.
Sovereignty has its origin in the power to control a given
territory, relates to political legitimacy, and may be collectively defined as that combination of powers which is essential for the functioning of a governmental structure, as the
regulatory agency, over a nation or state."3 Traditionally
this "combination of powers" has included the power to
tax, to exercise eminent domain, and to establish general police regulations with respect to human activity and the natural resources within the territorial j'urisdiction. These are
inherent powers. By contrast, dominium refers to ownership
of title in the property sense. Thus dominium can be granted
or conveyed, while sovereignty or imperium cannot be alien61. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1964).
62. See United States v. California, supra note 1, at 44 (dissent) (Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting). See generally Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2;
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 367, 408-16 (1842); SWIFT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT AND CLASSIC 120-200 (1969).
63. See United States v Texas, aupra note 1; Skiriotes v. Florida, supra note
1. See generally Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793);
SWIFr, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT AND CLAssic 120-200 (1969).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter discussed this topic in his dissenting opinion
concerning the tidelands in United States v. California, supra note 1,
at 43-45:
To speak of "dominion" carries precisely those overtones in the
law which relate to property and not to political authority. Dominion,
from the Roman concept dominium, was concrned with property and
ownership, as against imperium, which related to political sovereignty.
One may choose to say, for example, that the United States has
"national dominion" over navigable streams. But the power to regulate commerce over these streams, and its continued exercise, do not
change the imperium of the United States into dominium over the
land below the waters. Of course the United States has "paramount
rights" in the sea belt of California-the rights that are implied by
the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the power
of condemnation, the treaty-making power, the war power ...
Rights of ownership are here asserted-and rights of ownership
are something else. Ownership implies acquisition in the various
ways in which land is acquired-by conquest, by discovery and
by claim, by cession, by prescription, by purchase, by condemnation.
When and how did the United States acquire this land? . . .
.
That has not been remotely established except by sliding from
absence of ownership by California to ownership by the United States.
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ated." This distinction is important in the context of title
to the beds of navigable inland waters and of the marginal
seas.
Under the common law of England the King had both
jus privatum and jus publicum.6 Therefore, except as modified by colonial charter, the King of England had both dominium and imperium with respect to colonial territory. This
was the natural result of the right of discovery and claim,
possession having been taken in the name of the King of
England."
Subsequently, subject only to those rights surrendered to the national government under the Constitution
(either expressly or by implication),6" "upon the American

Revolution all the rights of the Crown and of Parliament
vested in the several states."" Thus, except for rights relinquished for the purposes of federalism, the original thirteen colonies and states later carved out of them69 had both
dominium and imperium as part of their territorial sovereignty. This included the title to lands beneath inland navigable waters and, until the tideland cases,7" included submerged lands under the marginal sea. These states were entirely free to develop their own tests with respect to both
title of beds and surface use for their navigable waters.'
The state of Texas, having once been a separate nation, could
64. See United States v. California, supra note 63 (dissenting opinion). For
a lucid explanation of these distinctions see Pound, supra note 42.
65. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2; Martin v. Waddell, supra note 62, at 40911 (1842) ; Commonwealth v. Alger, supra note 13, at 53, 90.
66. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2, at 14.
67. In United States v. Texas, supra note 1, the Court indicates two major
implication-: (1) The ,riginal 13 staes, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, reserved dominium over the beds of inland navigable waters. (2)
But by granting to the federal government such express powers as those
related to international relations, by implication the original states must
have granted dominium over the submerged lands in the marginal seas,
since according to the Court property must follow sovereignty. See Id. at
716-17.
68. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2, at 14-15.
69. The carved-out states were: Maine, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia,
and Vermont. See authorities notes 73, 104 infra and accompanying text.
70. United States v. Texas, supra note 1; United States v. Louisiana, supra
note 1; United States v. California, supra note 1. Compare supra note 67.
71. See United States v. Texas, supra note 1, at 716-17; United States v.
Oregon, supra note 1, at 14. But see United States v. Utah, supra note 1;
United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1. See also Hardin v. Jordan,
supra note 18, at 381-82.
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also claim this broad base of authority over its navigable
waters.72
The rest of the nation gained control over inland navigable waters under a different set of principles. Through a
series of vast land acquisitions, 2 the federal government
became the complete territorial sovereign over the land mass
that would eventually become the remaining states. The
United States was sole sovereign (imperium) and sole proprietor (dominiun.). As the Supreme Court stated the situation with respect to the public domain: "as is now well settled, the United States having rightfully acquired the Territories, and being the only government which can impose laws
upon them, have the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Territories, so long as they remain in a territorial condition.'"
B. PRIVATE AND FEDERAL LAND GRANTS

Federal land grants during the period of territorial
status are the source of some rights in navigable waters.
Since theUnited States was the sole proprietor, Congress
was free to dispose of territorial lands for reasons sufficient
72. When Texas was admitted, it reserved its territorial sovereignty but acquired equal footing. "Equal footing" with respect to the tidelands became a two-edged sword. Compare 5 Stat. 797 (1845) ; 9 Stat. 108 (1845)
wit/ United States v. Texas, supra note 71.
73. The first public domain lands were acquired by cession from the original
colonies to the United States between 1780 and 1802. These "western
lands" included all or part of the present states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi.
In 1803 the Louisiana Purchase included most of the plains states west
of the Mississippi River. Other important acquisitions included: the acquisition of the Red River Basin from Great Britain in 1818; the acquisition of Florida from Spain in 1819; the Oregon Compromise of 1846 with
Great Britain (including Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and parts of Montana
and Wyoming) ; the cessions from Mexico in 1848 of the southwestern
corner of the United States (including California, Nevada, Utah, most of
Arizona, and the western edges of some of the plains states); the purchase
from Texas in 1850 of parts of New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming that
remained between the Louisiana Purchase and the Mexican cessions of
1848; the Gadsen Purchase of 1853 from Mexico; and the purchase of
Alaska from Russia in 1867.
Federal controls over inland navigable waters through ownership of
public domain lands has never been a significant problem in Texas or
Hawaii. Texas was annexed in 1845 but had never surrendered territorial
sovereignty. Similarly, Hawaii was annexed in 1898 following the war
with Spain, but by the time Hawaii became a state in 1959 there was virtually no remaining unalienated public domain. See PuaIuc LAND LAW
REVIEW COMM'N., HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49-86, 285318 (1968). See also, Laurent, supra note 35, at 15-21.
74. Shively v. Bowlby, 8upra note 2, at 48.
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to itself.75 Of course here the pertinent lands are those under
or adjacent to navigable waters. With respect to these lands,
Congress, from the time of some of its early dispositions,
adopted the policy of reserving these lands, "save in exceptional instances when impelled to particular disposals by
some international duty or public exigency." 6 Disposition
was generally limited to situations which required transfers
for the improvement of foreign or interstate commerce or the
"carrying out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the territory was held." 7 The primary object in reserving title to the beds of navigable waters was that
of preserving them as public highways, forever free for
transportation and related public uses. This objective was
founded on the theory that as territorial sovereign the United
States should serve as trustee for the citizens of new states
to be carved out of the various territorial possessions and
that this trusteeship was incumbent on the United States as
a result of the nature of their land acquisitions.7" This is
consistent with the common law concept of jus publicum.79
Nonetheless, some federal land transfers did include the beds
to waters navigable under the federal test. The issue of
ownership of these beds turns on whether the waters are
navigable-in-fact under the federal tests and on whether the
United States intended to alienate." While this issue may
be raised in any context in which a pre-statehood land claim
is made," frequently this issue has occurred in cases involv75. See Alabama v. Texas supra note 60; United States v. Holt State Bank,
supra note 1 (dictum); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,
supra note 1; Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2. See generally PUBLIC LAND
LAW REVIEW COMM'N., supra note 73.

76. United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1, at 55.
77. Ibid.
78. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2, at 49; Hardin v. Jordan, supra note
18, at 381-82; Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221-22 (1844).
79. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2, at 48-49.
80. There is strong presumption against any intent to grant lands below the
high water mark. See Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2. But the extent of
the grant and the intent to alienate remain federal questions. See Borax
Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
81. E.g., Borax Consol. Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (whether
tideland included) ; Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2 (street dedication under title from federal grant) ; Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18 (limits of
government survey and patent) ; Knight v. United Land Ass'n., 142 U.S.
161 (1891) (grant confirmed by federal treaty); Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S.
(3 Wall.) 478 (1865) (prior Mexican grant confirmed by United States) ;
McKnight v. Broedell, 212 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mich. 1962) (title to artificially filled-in lands in Lake St. Clair).
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ing Indian treaties. For example, in Brewer-Elliot Oil & Gas
Co. v. United States,82 one issue was the validity of a grant to
the Osage Tribe; in United States v. Holt State Bank" the
title to lands ceded by the Chippewas of Minnesota was
challenged.
When territorial beds to federal navigable waters have
in fact, by clearly expressed intention on the part of the
United States, been conveyed and alienated, then purely
private rights are created." Federal grants to riparians on
navigable waters (under the federal test of navigability)
will not be presumed. The grant must be clear and unequivocal."3 However, when the grant is unambiguous, these
property rights are protected under the property clause
vis-a-vis the states through the supremacy clause. In the
normal course of events, under clearly established law,"6 title
to beds of navigable waters measured by the federal test
would have passed from the United States to each new state
upon its admission to the union, impressed with the same
trust indicated above in favor of public transportation and
related surface uses.87 The transfer of sovereignty to the
new state would have included these beds since that was the
character of the territorial sovereignty of the United States.8
Dominium over territorial lands generally was separable from
the imperium transferred to the new state, and the United
States, consistent with common law tradition, held the beds of
navigable waters in trust. There is even dicta in early cases
that this trusteeship precluded the United States from alien82. 260 U.S. 77 (1922). See also Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969).
83. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
84. E.g., Klais v. Danowski, 373 Mich. 262, 129 N.W.2d 414 (1964); accord;
Jeffries v. State, 373 Mich. 287, 129 N.W.2d 426 (1964). Dicta in many
cases support this position. See United States v. Holt State Bank, supra
note 1, at 55 (several cases cited).
Whether these private rights are limited to the use and enjoyment of
the subaqueous lands ( as in the case of extracting minerals) or extend to
exclusive surface use remains an open question to be determined by state
law. Only bed ownership is a federal question. See Johnson v. Seifert,
supra note 1, at 694 (1960).
85. United States v. Oregon, supra note 1; United States v. Holt State Bank,
supra note 1; Knight v. Broedell, supra note 81; accord, People v. Broedell,
365 Mich. 201, 112 N.W.2d 517 (1961); see Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2.
86. E.g., United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1.
87. See, e.g., Obrecht v. Nat'l. Gypsum Co., supra note 22.
88. See note 78 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Texas,
supra note 1.
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ating these beds.89 However, in Shively v. Bowlby,9 ° the Supreme Court rejected this position and found clear authority
for the power of Congress to make grants of territorial lands
below the high water mark of navigable waters, when consistent with public purposes inherent in the trusteeship."
In
short, the federal grant would limit the effective area over
which the state could exercise its local public trust doctrine
and the area which would normally have been allocated exclusively to public rights and uses. 2
In proper perspective, however, federal land grants to
private individuals have played an insignificant role in the
development of public and private rights in navigable waters.
This is largely because Congress has rarely granted lands
below high water mark when the riparian parcel abuts navigable water:
The Congress of the United States, in disposing
of the public lands, has constantly acted upon the
theory that those lands, whether in the interior, or
on the coast, above high water mark, may be taken
up by actual occupants, in order to encourage the settlement of the country; but that the navigable waters
and soils under them, whether within or above the
ebb and flow of the tide, shall be and remain public
highways; and, being chiefly valuable for the public
purposes of commerce, navigation and fishery, and
for the improvements necessary to secure and promote those purposes, shall not be granted away
89. E.g., Hardin v. Jordan, supra note 18, at 381; Barney v. Keokuk, supra
note 22, at 838.
90. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
91. Id. at 47-48.
92. This, of course, is true only when local state law restricts public surface
use to navigable waters for which the state obtained bed ownership from
the United States. Most states are not so restrictive. See e.g., Johnson v.
Seifert, aupra note 1, at 694. An exhaustive discussion of the scope of
public rights will be found in part two of this article. For a complete
discussion of the public trust doctrine see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in NaturalResource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Micn. L. REV.
473 (1970). However, the implication of the limitations created by federal grants can be found in Brewer-Elliott Gas & Oil Co. v. United States,
supra note 1, at 87-88:
The title of the Indians grows out of a federal grant when the Federal Government had complete sovereignty over the territory in question. Oklahoma when she came into the Union took sovereignty over
the public lands in the condition of ownership as they were then, and,
if the bed of a non-navigable stream had then become the property
of the Osages, there was nothing in the admission of Oklahoma into
a constitutional equality of power with other States which required or
permitted a divesting of the title.
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during the period of territorial government; but,
unless in case of some international duty or public
exigency, shall be held by the United States in
trust for the future states, and shall vest in the
several states, when organized and admitted into
the Union, with all the powers and prerogatives appertaining to the older states in regard to such
waters and soils within their respective jurisdictions; in short, shall not be disposed of piecemeal to
individuals as private property, but shall be held as
a whole for the purpose of being ultimately administered and dealt with for the public benefit by the
state, after it shall have become a completely organized community."
C. TERRITORIAL ORDINANCES AND STATEHOOD

Territorial regulations imposed by Congress have had a
recognizable but very limited impact on rights in navigable
waters. The extent of this impact has been measured for the
most part by the degree to which state courts have been willing to adopt pre-statehood restrictions in post-statehood
cases.9 4 The prevailing view is that these restrictions have
no operative effect in any state by their own force or authority, are not a federal mandate, but may be adopted
voluntarily by appropriate state constitutional provisions,"
legislation, 6 or case decisions. 7
93. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2, at 49-50.
94. See Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 288, 296 (1887)
Elder v. Delcour supra note 24; Lundberg v. Univ. of Notre Dame, supra
note 26. In Elder the Court adopted pre-statehood restrictions found in
federal statutes providing a governmental structure for the Missouri Territory, in enabling legislation for statehood, and in the state constitution
itself. Hence the adoption might be characterized as indirect. Similarly,
in Lundberg the court could have based its decision solely on the Wisconsin
Constitution. Instead Lundberg held the Northwest Ordinance directly
operative in that state, "regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of its
terms by the state constitution." Lundberg v. University of Notre Dame,
supra note 26, at 73.
95. See WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
96. George Dahl, Michigan Department of Natural Resources, has recently
suggested adopting a legislative definition of "navigability" based on the
language of the Northwest Ordinance. However, state statutory definitions
have tended to use the language of the federal test in The Daniel Ball,
supra note 20. E.g., N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271:9 (1966).
97. See Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., supra note 94; Shepard
v. Gates, 50 Mich. 495, 497 (1883); Burroughs v. Whitwam, 59 Mich. 279,
283 (1886). Thus, the Northwest Ordinance may be one source of the
"strict test" of navigability in Michigan. For a comprehensive discussion
of this "strict test" see Bartke, supra note 6. Thorough treatment of the
impact of the Northwest Ordinance on Wisconsin case law has been done.
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Most of the territorial legislation concerning navigable
waters had its origin in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
which was adopted under the Articles of Confederation to
provide for the government of the territory that eventually
would include the states of Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio,
Wisconsin, and part of the State of Minnesota. Although it
might technically be argued that this legislation was superseded by the federal constitution," the First Congress avoided this problem by stating that the Northwest Ordinance
would "continue to have full effect."9
The relevant provision of the Ordinance is found in Article IV:
The navigable waters leading into the Mississippi
and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between
the same, shall be common highways, and forever
free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory,
as to the citizens of the United States, and those of
any other States that may be admitted into the confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor.
Similar language may be found in subsequent federal
legislation providing for territorial government"" or for
admission of a new state to the Union.'' The position taken

98.
99.
100.

101.

Waite, supra note 26; Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a
Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 542; Note, Constitutional LawOrdinance of 1787-Navigable Waters-CarryingPlaces Between the Same,
1939 Wis. L. REV. 547. An important suggestion made by this latter group
of authorities is that the Ordinance is still controlling on interstate waters.
To support this view, a dictum in Economy Light & Power Co. v. United
States, 256 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1921), is cited.
See note 105 infra and accompanying text. See also 'Huse v. Glover, 119
U.S. 543 (1886).
1 Stat. 50 (1789).
For example, in 1812 federal legislation provided for a governmental
structure for the Missouri Territory:
The Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, and the navigable waters flowing into them, and the carrying places between the same, shall be
common highways and forever free to the people of the said territory
and to the citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty or impost therefor. 2 Stat. 743, 747 (1812).
The enabling legislation for Louisiana is illustrative:
Provided, that it shall be taken as a condition upon which the said
state is incorporated in the Union, that the river Mississippi, and the
navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, and into the Gulf
of Mexico, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the
inhabitants of the said state as to the inhabitants of other states
and the territories of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost
or toll therefor, imposed by the said state; and that the above condition, and also all other the [sic] conditions and terms contained in
the third section of the act, the title whereof is hereinbefore recited,
shall be considered, deemed and taken, fundamental conditions and
terms, upon which the said state is incorporated in the Union. 2 Stat.
701, 703 (1812).
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by the Supreme Court concerning the continuing efficacy
of these enactments is found in Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co."°2 That all new states be admitted to the
Union on an "equal footing" is a constitutional requirement.'
To place restrictions on new states that were not
placed on the thirteen original states (and states carved out
of them),' as a result of pre-statehood legislation, would
be a denial of "equal footing:"
The following states entered the Union under federal enabling legislation which included language similar to that used in the Northwest
Ordinance concerning navigable waters: 11 Stat. 388 (1859) (Oregon); 11
Stat. 166 (1857) (Minnesota); 9 Stat. 452, 453 (1850) (California); 9
Stat. 56, 57 (1846) (Wisconsin); 9 Stat. 117 (1846), 5 Stat. 742 (1845)
(Iowa); 3 Stat. 545, 546 (1820) (Missouri); 3 Stat. 489, 492 (1819) (Alabama) (subject to rejection or adoption); 3 Stat. 348, 349 (1817) (Mississippi); 2 Stat. 701, 703 (1812) (Louisiana).
By implication Arkansas
might also be added to the list. See 5 Stat. 50, 52 (1836) (cross reference
to Missouri).
Authorization for statehood for Hawaii and Alaska was expressly
made subject to the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. 73 Stat. 4 (1959) [§ 5
(i)]; 72 Stat. 339 (1958) [§ 6(m)].
102. 123 U.S. 288, 296 (1887).
103. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566-67 (1911).
104. For a list of "carved-out" states see note 69 supra.
Federal enabling legislation authorized statehood for all states subsequent to the original 13. Nearly all this legislation employed "equalfooting" language:
Alabama-3 Stat. 608 (1819);
Alaska-72 Stat. 339 (1958);
Arizona-37 Stat. 39 (1911); 37 Stat. 1728 (1912);
Arkansas-5 Stat. 50 (1836);
California-9 Stat. 452 (1850);
Colorado-18 Stat. 474 (1875); 19 Stat. 665 (1876);
Florida-5 Stat. 742 (1845);
Hawaii-73 Stat. 4 (1959);
Idaho-26 Stat. 215 (1890);
Illinois-8 Stat. 428 (1818); 3 Stat. 536 (1818);
Indiana-3 Stat. 289 (1816); 3 Stat. 399 (1816);
Iowa-5 Stat. 742 (1845);
Kansas-12 Stat. 126 (1861);
Louisiana-2 Stat. 641 (1811); 2 Stat. 701 (1812);
Maine-3 Stat. 544 (1820);
Michigan-5 Stat. 49 (1836); 5 Stat. 144 (1837);
Minnesota-ll Stat. 166 (1857); 11 Stat. 285 (1858);
Mississippi-8 Stat. 348 (1817); 8 Stat. 472 (1817);
Missouri-3 Stat. 545 (1820);
Montana-25 Stat. 676 (1889); 26 Stat. 1551 (1889);
Nebraska-13 Stat. 47 (1864); 14 Stat. 391 (1867);
Nevada-13 Stat. 30 (1864) ;
New Mexico-37 Stat. 39 (1911); 37 Stat. 1723 (1912);
North Dakota-25 Stat. 676 (1889); 26 Stat. 1548 (1889);
Ohio-2 Stat. 173 (1802);
Oklahoma-34 Stat. 267 (1906); 35 Stat. 2160 (1907);
Oregon-l Stat. 383 (1859);
South Dakota-25 Stat. 676 (1889); 26 Stat. 1549 (1889);
Tennessee-I Stat 491 (1796) ;
Texas-5 Stat. 797 (1845); 9 Stat. 108 (1845);
Utah-28 Stat. 107 (1894);
Washington-25 Stat. 676 (1889); 26 Stat. 1552 (1889);
West Virginia-12 Stat. 633 (1862);
Wisconsin-9 Stat. 56 (1846);
Wyoming-26 Stat. 222 (1890).
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There was no contract in the fourth article of
the Ordinance of 1787 respecting the freedom of the
navigable waters of the territory north-west of the
Ohio River emptying into the St. Lawrence, which
bound the people of the territory, or of any portion
of it, when subsequently formed into a State and admitted to the Union. The Ordinance of 1787 was
passed a year and some months before the Constitution of the United States went into operation.
Its framers, and the congress of the confederation
which passed it, evidently considered that the principles and declaration of rights and privileges expressed in its articles would always be of binding
obligation upon the people of the territory. The ordinance in terms ordains and declares that its articles "shall be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the people and States
in the said territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent." And, for many
years after the adoption of the constitution, its provisions were treated by various acts of congress as
in force, except as modified by such acts. In some
of the acts organizing portions of the territory under
separate territorial governments, it is declared that
the rights and privileges granted by the ordinance
are secured to the inhabitants of those territories.
Yet, from the very conditions on which the States
formed out of that territory were admitted to the
Union, the provisions of the ordinance became inoperative except as adopted by them. All the States
thus formed were, in the language of the resolutions
or acts of Congress, "admitted into the Union on an
equal footing with the original States, in all respects
whatever." Michigan, on her admission, became
therefore, entitled to and possessed of all the rights
of sovereignty and dominion which belonged to the
original States, and could at any time afterwards
exercise full control over its navigable waters except
as restrained by the Constitution of the United
When this language was omitted, the onmission does not appear to have
been intentional. See 1 Stat. 189 (1791) (Kentucky); 1 Stat. 191 (1791)
(Vermont). The fact that Kentucky and Vermont were carved out of the
original 13 states and therefore may have acquired "original" sovereignty
rather than equal footing does not appear to have been significant. Compare Maine, Tennessee, and West Virginia, supra.
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States, and laws of Congress passed in pursuance
thereof .... "'
The Supreme Court has reached the same position with respect to territories not covered by the Northwest Ordinance. 106 Once a state adopts its own constitution, all federal
pre-admission legislation is superseded."°7
The exception is the situation in which a state voluntarily adopts these restrictions for its intrastate navigable
waters. For example, Wisconsin adopted the wording of
the Northwest Ordinance almost verbatim in its state constitution.'
The impact of this language on rights in navigable
waters could be said to operate by force of the state constitution standing alone, with no weight given to the Ordinance.
However, the highest court in Wisconsin has chosen to make
the Ordinance operative: "article 4 of the Northwest Ordinance applies to and is in full force in Wisconsin, and this
regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of its terms by the
state constitution. "'9 A similar position is taken by Missouri. Territorial legislation to establish a governmental
structure in pre-statehood Missouri included language not
unlike that found in the Northwest Ordinance."' In Elder
v. Delcomr,"' the Missouri Supreme Court sitting en bane
extended a broad range of public rights to waters that would
not have been navigable even under the federal test. The
primary basis for this extension was the same freedom-ofnavigable-waters language found in pre-statehood statutes
for both governmental structure and for admission to the
Union, and in the state constitution.
105. Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., supra note 94, at 295-96;
accord, Huse v. Glover, supra note 98. See also Chapin v. Fye, 179 U.S.
127 (1900); Palmer v. Cuyahoga County, 18 Fed. Cas. 1026 (No. 10,688)
(C.C. Ohio 1843).
106. See Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 216-17 (1917); Permoli v. First
Municipality of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 (1845).
107. See authorities notes 105-06 supra. An exception may exist for interstate
waters. See supra note 97.
108. See supra note 95, 99-100 and accompanying text.
109. Lundberg v. University of Notre Dame, supra note 26, at 282 N.W. 73.
Compare Muench v. Public Service Comn'n., 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514
(1952), with Willow River Club v. Wade, 100 Wis. 86, 76 N.W. 273 (1898).
110. Supra note 100.
111. 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
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STATEHOOD AND BEYOND

As indicated earlier, under traditional principles of
common law and international law dominium and imperium
are normally separable and separate.1 12 Thus a specific cession or grant would be required before a transfer of sovereignty would carry with it proprietary ownership and title
to territorial lands including submerged lands beneath navigable waters. The Supreme Court has reversed this theoretical basis for jurisdiction over (and title to) lands underlying
navigable waters. With respect to the submerged lands under
the marginal sea, which are discussed below, the Court held
that property interests (dominium) are so subordinated to
sovereignty that title must follow the sovereign."' Thus title
is transferred by implication when sovereignty is transferred ;114 this applies to the beds to navigable waters in contradistinction to other public domain lands. The Court has apparently taken this same position of tranfser by judicial fiat
rather than by express conveyance with respect to inland
and nontidal navigable waters in public domain states."'
This position is reached by a merger of two lines of reasoning.
One line is a simple, straight forward negation of the separate character of dominium and imperium, as discussed above.
The other centers around the constitutional requirement
known as the "equal footing" doctrine."'
It is assumed
by the Court that the Republic of Texas and the original
states within the limits of territorial sovereignty by virtue
of obtaining political independence, and the -United States
with respect to the public domain, had complete dominium."7
Though the words 'equal footing" may not appear in every'
federal enabling statute which authorizes admission to a new
state, equal footing is implied and required. Equal footing
does not establish equality of economic advantage; it creates
112. United States v. Texas, supra note 1.
113. Id. Accord, United States v. Louisiana, supra note 1; United States v.
California, supra note 1.
114. See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
115. The exceptions are the 13 original states, states carved out of them, and
Texas; all these retained complete internal sovereignty. See supra notes
65-74 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
117. See United States v. Texas, supra note 1; Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2.
118. See supra note 104.
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parity with respect to political standing and sovereignty.
Hence, to be on an equal footing with the original states,
the states carved out of the public domain must also have
complete dominium over beds of navigable waters. United
States v. Texas"' summarizes these two lines of reasoning:
Yet the "equal footing" clause has long been
held to have a direct effect on certain property
rights. Thus the question early arose in controversies between the Federal Government and the
States as to the ownership of the shores of navigable
waters and the soils under them. It was consistently
held that to deny to the States, admitted subsequent
to the formation of the Union, ownership of this
property would deny them admission on an equal
footing with the original States, since the original
States did not grant these properties to the United
States but reserved them to themselves. See Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 228-229 ...
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26. The theory of
these decision was aptly summarized by Mr. Justice
Stone speaking for the Court in United States v.
State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14, as follows: "Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil
under them are so identified with the sovereign
power of government that a presumption against
their separation from sovereignty must be indulged,
in construing either grants by the sovereign of the
lands to be held in private ownership or transfer of
sovereignty itself.... For that reason, upon the admission of a state to the Union, the title of the United States to lands underlying navigable waters
within the state passes to it, as incident to the transfer to the state of local sovereignty, and is subject
only to the paramount power of the United States to
control such waters for purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce." 2 [Emphasis added.]
State ownership of the beds of navigable waters almost
always guarantees the public the right to surface use of these
waters for transportation and other public recreational pur119. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
120. Id. at 716-17.
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poses.'2 1 Although the precise scope of these rights will be
delineated in part two of this article, it is important to note
that under state tests for navigability (and the resulting
right of public user) public use of navigable surface waters
may be protected under variations of the public easement
theory or the public trust doctrine even though the state
has relinquished bed ownership,'2 2 or perhaps without regard
for the issue of subaqueous title.'
Nonetheless, when the
issue is the source of public and private rights in navigable
waters under state law vis-a-vis the impact of federal standards or limitations on these rights, the question of bed title
is important. In addition to the general limitations on statecreated rights in navigable waters under the major federal
powers discussed in this paper (including the commerce
power discussed below), the federal test for navigability is
also applied to the issue of bed title.2 4 Waters which are
not navigable under the federal test may still be subjected
to state controls, as decsribed in part two of this article, but
this is a function of the state's exercise of internal sovereignty rather than a reflection of a federal mandate. In brief,
subject to any pre-statehood federal grants below the high
water mark, the beds of navigable waters passed to the respective states upon their admission to the Union. This
transfer of bed title is an inherent element of the transfer
of territorial sovereignty from the federal government. 5
The federal enabling acts authorizing statehood did not expressly convey any of these lands. In fact they normally
121. But see Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905).
A complete
discussion of this point is found in part two of this article. See generally
Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western
Lakes and Streams, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 (1967); Waite, Public
Rights in Indiana Waters, 37 INDIANA L. J. 467 (1962); Note, Water Recreation-PublicUse of "Private" Waters, 52 CALI. L. REv 171 (1964).
122. E.g., Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38, 211 N.W. 115 (1926); accord,
Muench v. Public Service Comm'n., supra note 109; Day v. Armstrong,
supra note 12. See generally Sax, supra note 92.

123. E.g., Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n. v. Hogarth, 81 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1936); Elder
v. Delcour, supra note 24; State ex rel. Game Comm'n. v. Red River Valley
Co., 51 N. M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945) ; Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 652,
56 P.2d 1158 (1936); accord, People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373, 164
N.Y.S.2d 423 (1957); Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons,
Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373 (1959); Muench v. Public Service
Comm'n., supra note 109. But see Hartman v. Tresise, supra note 121.
124. United States v. Utah, supra note 1; United States v. Holt State Bank,
supra note 1.
125. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
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made express general reservations of public domain lands. 2 '
All of the public domain lands, including beds to nonnavigable
waters, were to pass into private control under federal grants.
Thus the source of state controls over navigable waters
(from the perspective of federal constraints) is measured
by bed ownership, which in turn is limited by the federal
test of navigability.'27
If the waters in question were navigable under the federal test on the date when the state was admitted to the Union,
the beds automatically passed into state ownership. If they
were not then navigable under this test, title remained in
the United States. This issue cannot be determined uider
state rules for property or water rights. "To treat the
question as turning on the varying local rules would give the
Constitution a diversified operation where uniformity was
intended..".2 The Supreme Court in United States v. Utah'2
has declared that inconsistent state tests for navigability cannot be employed to determine bed title:
[N] avigability is thus determinative of the controversy, and that is a federal question. State laws
cannot affect titles vested in the United States.
The test of navigability has frequently been
10
stated by this Court. In The Daniel Ball .
The Court went on to indicate that the test to be applied as
of the admission date is the more narrow characterization of
Thus,
the federal rule as expressed in The Daniel Ball.'
for purposes of determining state ownership of bed title,
those waters are deemed "navigable" which were "susceptible
of being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce ' on the date indicated. The rivers
in question in the Utah case flowed through a very sparsely
settled region. Hence little past history of navigation could
126. Authorities cited note 104 supra.
127. United States v. Utah, supra note 1; United States v. Holt State Bank,
supra note 1; accord, Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra note 80.
128. United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1, at 56.
129. 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
130. Id. at 75-76.
131. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
See generally Johnson & Austin, supra note 121.
132. United States v. Utah, supra note 1, at 76 (quoting from Holt State
Bank). (Emphasis added.)
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be shown under the navigation-in-fact aspect of the federal
test. Nonetheless:
Utah, with its equality of right as a state of the
Union, is not to be denied title to the beds of such of
its rivers as were navigable in fact at the time of
the admission of the state either because the location
of the rivers and the circumstances of the exploration and settlement of the country through which
they flowed had made recourse to navigation a late
adventure or because commercial utilization on a
large scale awaits future demands. The. question
remains one of fact as to the capacity of the rivers
in their ordinary condition to meet the needs of
commerce as these may arise in connection with the
growth of the population, the multiplication of activities, and the development of natural resources.
And this capacity may be shown by physical characteristics and experimentation as well as by the uses
to which the streams have been put. 3
It is interesting that while the Court in Utah had not yet
reached the expanded federal test applied in United States
v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.," 4 the passage just quoted
could be interpreted by the present Court to include recreational uses of waters. Recreational boating might be construed as "commerce" in light of the size of the industry
and the impact of boat manufacturing and sales and related
services on interstate commerce. However, dicta in the Appalachian case seems to indicate that the more narrow conceptualization of the federal test as stated in The Daniel Ball
will control the issue of bed title." 5 Hence, any state controls over public and private rights in navigable waters
which depend on state ownership of these beds will also depend on the navigability test in The Daniel Ball. The expanded federal test which includes the concept of reasonable
improvements and navigational aids is therefore, by implication, limited in application to cases of admiralty jurisdiction
and to cases under the commerce clause.
133. Id. at 83.
134. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
135. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. For a good discussion of this
point see Johnson & Austin supra note 121, at 15-20.
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E. THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT

The only remaining federal source of rights in navigable waters under the property clause is the Submerged
Lands Act.'3 6 As a factual matter, the tidelands cases137 related only to the submerged lands beneath the marginal sea.
However, there was sufficient language in these cases to
form the basis for the apprehension by non-coastal states
that federal control over inland navigable waters and their
beds had also been declared." 8 The specific holding in each
of these three cases was that state ownership of submerged
lands in the marginal sea ended at the low water mark. Moreover, there are clear implications in United States v. Texas'39
that the Court is making a distinction between tidal waters
and inland navigable waters for purposes of sovereign control.14 ° In any event, whether well-founded or not, the indicated apprehension expressed itself strongly in the halls
of Congress. The result was the Submerged Lands Act.
This enactment provides:
It is determined and declared to be in the public
interest that (1) title to and ownership of the lands
beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of
the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters * * * be, and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed,
established and vested in and assigned to the respective States .
1..."
The phrase, "lands beneath navigable waters" as defined in
the Act includes:
all lands within the boundaries of each of the respective States which are covered by nontidal waters
that were navigable under the laws of the United
States at the time such State became a member of
the Union, or acquired sovereignty over such lands
and waters thereafter, up to the ordinary high water
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1964).
Supra note 42.
See notes 41-42 8upra and accompanying text.
339 U.S.. 707 (1950).
Id. at 717-19.
43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1964).
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mark as heretofore or hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction ...

142

This act was upheld in Alabama v. Texas... wherein the
Court indicated in a per curiam opinion that, under the
property clause, Congress has unlimited powers of disposition of the lands within the public domain. The tidelands
cases had clarified ownership of the submerged lands within
the marginal sea and had declared that ownership to be in
the United States. Hence Congress could dispose of it (giving it to the states) "as a private individual may deal with
his farming property." 44
There is some authority for the proposition that the
states never had dominium over the beds of inland navigable
waters prior to the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act.'
However, the cases can more easily be rationalized by recognizing that the Supreme Court simply refused to follow the
traditional rule of separating imperium and dominium.
From this premise the Court could logically conclude that
the states (1) never owned the submerged lands within the
marginal sea below ordinary low water mark and (2) had
always reserved to themselves (or acquired under the equal
footing doctrine) the beds of inland navigable waters. The
actual source of state ownership of these inland beds, therefore, is left to historical conjecture. In any event, after the
Submerged Lands Act state ownership was clearly established
and has been upheld in subsequent cases.'46 The resulting
state control is the source of many public and private rights
in state navigable waters.
5. The Commerce Clause
As emphasized in all of the foregoing discussion, all
state-created rights in navigable waters are subject to the
142.
143.
144.
145.

43 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1) (1964).
347 U.S. 272 (1954).
Id. at 273.
Green, The Source of State Ownership of the Beds of Nontidal Navigable
Waters, 6 LAND & NAT. RES. DIv. J. 367 (1968). See also Swarth, Offshore
Submerged Lands-An Historical Synopsis, 6 LAND & NAT. RES. Div. J.
109 (1968).
146. See, e.g., Bowes v. Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 175, 120 N.E.2d 15, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 857 (1954) ; Obrecht v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 22. Both
cases dealt with the beds of the Great Lakes.
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exercise of paramount constitutional powers by the United
States in areas of national concern which require uniform
regulation.1 4
Perhaps the most extensive of these powers
is the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.
Mention has already been made of areas in which powers
under the commerce clause have been combined with other
expressly granted constitutional powers to legitimize the
exercise of federal authority. Some of the cases dealt with in
this section of the article involve such combinations, but
these aspects will not be repeated. Here the concern is with
the extent and scope of the limitations, under the commerce
clause, that are placed on public and private rights established under state law. Of course any state law or property
rule, inconsistent with the federal exercise of power described
here, cannot withstand a challenge which raises the federal
question. On the other hand, the public is relatively free
to exercise recreational surface uses of navigable waters
under fedreal control when these uses are consistent with the
paramount federal program or national interest."'
The impact of the commerce clause on public and private
rights falls into two major categories. Both areas require
the "taking" of property interests, but the distinction between the two is that one category of "takings"' 4 9 requires
compensation while the other does not. No attempt will be
made here to exhaust either of these areas. This would be
beyond the scope of this article and has, to a large degree,
already been accomplished by other authors.'
The concern
of this article is to highlight the major areas of impact and
147. See United States v. Texas, aupra note 1, at 717.
148. Compare State v. Jones, 143 Iowa 398, 122 N.W. 241 (1909), aff'd sub
nom., Marshall Dental Mfg. Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460 (1913) with Curry
v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969). See also Note, Water Recreation-Public Use of "Private" Waters, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1964).

149.

See generally Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964);
HINES, A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE UNDER THE IOWA WATER PERMIT SYSTEM

73-84 (Univ. of Iowa Agricultural Law Center Monograph No. 9, 1966).

150. See Bartke, The Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Struggle

for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REv. 1 (1968);

Morreale, Federal Power in

Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation,

3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 1 (1963); Sato, Water Resources-Comments on
the Federal-State Relationship, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 43 (1960); Silverstein,
The Legal Concept of Navigability v. Navigability in Fact, 19 ROCKY MT.

L. REV. 49 (1946) ; Comment, Just Compensation and the Navigation Power,
31 WASH. L. REV. 271 (1956).
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to describe the source of federal limitations imposed on rights
created under state tests for navigability.
In both of these areas the federal test of navigability as
stated in the Appalachian Elec. Power Co."' case is controlling. However, the source of this expanded doctrine and,
more importantly, the basis for applying it to nearly all
waters is found in earlier cases. The first major case in this
area is Gibbons v. Ogden."' In Gibbons Chief Justice
Marshall established the basis for federal involvement in
navigable waters by pointing out the obvious-that "comThus,
merce" includes the concept of ."navigation." 53
when a state license which grants exclusive rights to navigation in waters within the territorial limits of New York
conflicts with a federal license, the state license is invalid.
Though acts of Congress are limited to specific constitutional
54
objectives, as to those objects, the federal power is plenary.'
Therefore, if "commerce" includes control over "navigation,' 55 then a fortiori the federal test of navigability
limits state-created rights in interstate waters.
However, even under the statement of the test in The
Daniel Ball, the waters may be wholly within a single state. 5 '
Once the federal test is satisfied with respect to a particular
body of water, the federal power over commerce (navigation)
extends to the farthest reaches of that stream. For example,
in United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,"'
federal control over nonnavigable segments of a stream was
validated because this exercise of control would protect the
navigable capacity of downstream segments which were in
fact navigable. Moreover, the federal test includes the concept of indelible navigability-once navigable, always navigable. Thus in Economy Light & Power Co. v. United
States,5 ' the Court had to reach back into early American
fur trading history to find evidence of useful commercial
311 U.S. 377 (1940).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 197.
This may require a strained interpretation. Supra note 57.
The Grand River is entirely within the State of Michigan.
Ball v. United States, supra note 20.
157. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
158. 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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trade and travel to establish navigability in fact. Of course
historical searches may not be necessary if "navigability"
can be established under the Appalachian concept of reasonable improvements, which need not yet be even authorized.
Moreover, the Appalachian court clearly indicated that
federal control over navigation extends to any activity that
may have a substantial impact on water-based commerce:
Flood protection, watershed development, recovery
of the cost of improvements through utilization of
power are likewise parts of commerce control ....
Water power development from dams in navigable
streams is from the public's standpoint a by-product
of the general use of the rivers for commerce ...
The point is that navigable waters are subject to
national planning and control in the broad regulation 1of
commerce granted to the Federal Govern5
ment. 0
Cases subsequent to Appalachian have clarified federal
authority over nonnavigable waters under the federal test.
A fair reading of these cases seems to indicate that federal
control does extend to nonnavigable waters as long as Congress has expressly stated that some aspect of the program
or project will have a definite impact on navigation. Frequently navigation is protected by controlling floodwaters.
A common congressional response to flood control has been
projects requiring huge impoundments. While these frequently create new recreational areas, some rights established
under state tests of navigability may have to be subordinated.
Nonetheless, when Congress has decided to protect navigation, the exercise of power is authorized.'
The Court
stated this position in Oklahonm v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. :181
There is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot, under the commerce power, treat the watersheds
as a key to flood control on navigable streams and
their tributaries. Nor is there a constitutional ne159.

United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., supra note 23, at 426-27.
"The Congressional authority under the commerce clause is complete unless
limited by the Fifth Amendment." Ibid.
160. United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 29; United States
v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Arizona v. California, 283
U.S. 423 (1931).
161. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
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cessity for viewing each reservoir project in isolation
from a comprehensive plan covering the entire basin
of a particular river, ....
[I]t is common knowledge that Mississippi floods have paralyzed commerce in the affected areas and have impaired navigation itself. . . . [T]he power of flood control extends to tributaries. .. . For, just as control over
the nonnavigable parts of a river may be essential
or desirable in the interests of the navigable portions, so may the key to flood control on a navigable
stream be found in whole or in part in flood control
on its tributaries. As repeatedly recognized by the
Court from McColloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
to United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, the exercise
of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce may be aided by appropriate and
needful control of activities and agencies, which
though intrastate, affect that commerce.16 2
This position has recently been reaffirmed in United States
v. Grand River Dam Authority.'6 3 In addition, the congressional decisions in this area come within the judicial
protection given to legislative discretion and hence are not
reviewable except under extreme circumstances.' 64
It is not for the courts, however, to substitute their
judgments for congressional decisions on what is or
is not necessary for the improvement or protection
of navigation. . . . The decision of Congress that
this project will serve the interests of navigation
involves engineering and policy considerations for
Congress and Congress alone to evaluate. Courts
should respect that decision until and unless it is
shown to involve an impossibility .... '
The preceding examination of federal cases has identified the potential range of limitations imposed on rights in
navigable waters in the broad sense. On the other hand, in
every federal activity developed under the auspices of the
162. Id. at 525-26.
163. 363 U.S. 229 (1960).
164. United States v. Grand River Darn Authority, supra note 29; United States
v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 160; United States v. Commodore Park,
Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., upra note 9.
165. United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 160, at 224.
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commerce clause in which property rights are taken,"6 including the right to use the surface of navigable waters, just
compensation becomes an issue.16 7 Therefore, from a more
narrow perspective of potential limitations, the compensation
issue provides another potential restriction on rights under
state law. If adequate compensation is paid and the only
objection raised by the one whose property interest has been
taken is a basic disagreement concerning the justification
for the federal program, the remedy is the ballot box. On the
other hand, if no compensation is required, the "no-compensation" rule 6 ' becomes another source of federal restrictions
on public and private rights under state law.
The origin of the no-compensation rule is a peculiar
characterization of property rights in the overlying waters
in navigable lakes and streams. Bed ownership is a separate
issue and has already been discussed. The implication in the
cases that have developed the no-compensation rule is that
navigable waters are nationally owned. The Court stated this
concept in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co.:" "Ownership of a private stream wholly upon lands
of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water
in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership
is inconceivable. 17 ° While "ownership" in this context is
perhaps a poor choice of terminology,1 7' the implication of
national proprietary control of navigable waters seems clear.
Therefore, the extent of public and private rights in navigable
waters to be distributed under state law, when the federal
navigational servitude applies, is left to the discretion of
Congress. One author has concluded that the unifying principle in the development of these compensation cases is "frank
recognition . . .that the federal navigation servitude is pro72
prietary in character. "1
166. See generally authorities cited notes 149-50 supra and accompanying text.
167. "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168. Authorities cited note 150. supra.
169. 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
170. Id. at 69.
171. Several authors have discussed this passage. Bartke, supra note 150, at
8-9; Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights
Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 604, 616 (1957) ; Morreale, supra
note 150 at 37.
172. Bartke, supra note 150, at 41.
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It is important to keep in mind that compensation is
required for most exercises of the commerce clause in the
broad sense. "It is not the broad constitutional power to
regulate commerce, but rather the servitude derived from
that power and narrower in scope, that frees the Government
from liability in these cases.' 1..
Moreover, the navigational
easement or federal navigational servitude has definite
limits. Congress has broad powers over navigation.1 74 But
the navigational servitude does not extend beyond the bed
of navigable water. This is measured by and limited to the
ordinary high-water mark. 7 ' If the water does not in fact
reach that level, artificial devices may be employed to maintain the area covered by the servitude at its maximum. 7 ' Below ordinary high-water mark all property rights, including
usufructuary interests, are held at the discretion of Congress. 7 As the Court in United States v. Willow River
Power Co.7 explained, these proprietary and usufructuary
interests are mere privileges, "permissible so long as compatible with navigation interests."' 7 9 "Property" in the
true sense of the word exists only when the interest in the
tangible or intangible is protected by law. Willow River
goes on to explain that interests below the ordinary highwater mark are not "protected by law when.. . [they become] inconsistent with plans authorized by Congress for
improvement of navigation."'8 s
Since there is no "property," nothing is "taken."
Hence no compensation is required. In short, " When the United States appropriates the
173. United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950).
174. E.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967)
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (control over
wastes dumped into navigable waters); United States v. Commodore Park,
Inc., supra note 164 (power to destroy navigability); United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (alteration of water levels);
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (water
diversion); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907)
(bridges across navigable waters).
175. United States v. Willow River Power Co., supra note 174, at 509.
176. See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., supra note 173.
177. See United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 160 (property values
related to stream flow); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power
Co., supr, note 9 (right to water level as a head for power production);
Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913)
(ownership and use of beds) ; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900)
(appurtenant right of access).
178. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
179. Id. at 509.
180. Ibid.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

41

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 5 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 5

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. V

flow either of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream pursuant

to its superior power under the Commerce Clause, it is exer81
cising established prerogatives and is beholden to no one."1
This rule also applies to nonnavigable tributaries so long as
Congress expressly indicates that the power is exercised for

the protection or improvement of navigation on the navigable
mainstream." 2

In addition, property values above the ordi-

nary high-water mark, which are attributable to the location
of the property in relation to the navigable water, are not
compensable 8 3
II.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

As water resources become increasingly more important
in the quest to improve environmental quality and to satisfy
the economic requirements of the respective states, the determination of public and private rights in these resources
will assume a significantly expanded role. To date the issue
has been "navigability."
Tomorrow the determinative criterion may be some generic concept of "public waters,"

stripped of all the historic trappings that have encumbered
the navigability touchstone. However, unless such a change
is accomplished by legislative activity, the transition may
be time consuming.'"
The courts have struggled with the
concept of navigability, and with the issue of bed ownership,
so long that they may be unable to extricate themselves from

their self-created confusion.
181.
182.
183.
184.

United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 29, at 233.
See United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, supra note 29.
United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra note 160.
An important issue in this context is whether legislative declarations that
certain waters are "public" involves a "taking" for which compensation
must be paid. See generally authorities cited note 149 supra. Thus the
legislative declaration itself may foster time-consuming constitutional challenges. For example, recently proposed legislation in Michigan would define a "navigable stream" as any watercourse which has ever been capable
of "providing a public fishery." Mich. House Bill No. 2377 (March 3, 1969)
(as amended). An internal working document for the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, dated March 2, 1970, will amend House Bill
No. 2377 to define a "public fishery" as any part of a stream which "contains a supply of fish of such numbers and legal sizes as to be capable of
meeting public demand." In addition to the question of whether there is
a "taking," there is still the issue of whether the legislation is reasonable
in its appliation. In the analogous area of land use controls, for example,
zoning is not per se a taking. This premise allows the court to turn to a
determination of the reasonableness of the legislation. See ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 2.09-.10 (1968).
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The first half of this article has demonstrated that the
federal test for navigability has a potentially broad range of
areas in which it may control or restrict public and private
water rights. As one author has stated, the scope of federal
power in these areas is "almost embarrassingly extensive. 1" However, it is the view of this author that the shadow of federal jurisdiction that hangs over state-created
rights in navigable waters is at least neutral if not benevolent. This view is supported by the following propositions
which summarize the first part of this article and which place
federal restrictions on these rights in their proper perspective:
(1) Federal controls over navigable waters have been
exercised only in areas of legitimate national concern. 8 '
(2) The federal test for navigability is mandatory only
in the narrow situation in which ownership of the beds of
navigable waters is determinative.' 87
(3) State-owned beds may be disposed of under state
8
8

law.1

(4) Rights to surface use both by the public and by private riparians is determined, for the most part, by state
89
law.
(5) There is a strong likelihood that the Supreme Court,
if directly confronted today with the issue of whether the
federal test of navigability or a conflicting state test of navigability is controlling in the context of conflicts over surface
uses of water, would hold that the state test controls' 9
It is almost unnecessary to state that political considera185. SAX, WATER LAW-CASES AND COMMENTARY 413 (1965).
186. See United States v. Texas, supra note 1; United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., supra note 23; Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra
note 81; United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1; Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
187. See United States v. Texas, supra note 1; United States v. Utah, supra
note 1; United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 1; Brewer-Elliott
Gas & Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 1.
188. Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 1; Barney v. City of Keokuk, supra note 22;
Nedtweg v. Wallace, supra note 22; accord, United States v. Oregon,
supra note 1; see United States v. Texas, supra note 1.
189. See authorities cited notes 121-23 supra.
190. See United States v. Texas, supra note 1, at 716-17; United States v. Oregon, supra note 1, at 14.
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tions have entered into most, if not all, federal exercises of
power over navigable waters. Nonetheless, when challenged,
federal programs have for the most part been found to fall
within a legitimate area of constitutional authority. This
may not be a satisfying answer to those who view state sovereignty as paramount, but these manifestations of federal
control are a realistic expectation under our federal system.
With the notable exception of the natural resources removed
from state control by the Tidelands Cases,'91 implemented
federal controls on navigable bodies of water seem to come
within the gamut of legislative discretion. The paramount
national interests that may be expressed under the treaty
and war powers or under the admiralty jurisdiction are inherent in national sovereignty. Federal controls over navigable waters under the general welfare clause possess a more
ambivalent status, but from a national perspective, the benefits can normally be expected to outweigh the costs.' 0 Similarly, there can be little objection to uniform regulations
with respect to interstate commerce, commercial navigation,
and related land-water management practices which have an
impact on these forms of surface use." 3 Moreover, if the
federal control of navigable waters in situations in which
the federal navigational servitude applies is in fact proprietary in character,'94 then in those situations the federal
government should be entitled to the same reasonable use
and enjoyment of its property interests that individuals enjoy. In addition, one cannot help but look with optimism on
an emerging basis for private litigation which may compel
federal agencies and programs to consider state and local
interests when a project is implemented.' 95 As a result,
public rights in surface use, and even private considerations,
under state tests for navigability may, in the near future,
191. Authorities cited note 42 supra.
192. Policies, Standards and Procedures in the Formulation,Evaluation and
Review of Plans for Use and Development of Water and Related Land Resources, S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
193. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
194. See generally Bartke, supra note 150. See also Alabama v. Texas, supra
note 60, at 273.
195. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n,
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) ; see Note, Standing to Sue and Conservation
Values, 38 U. CoLo. L. R~v. 391 (1966).
See also The Conservation
Foundation, CF LETTERl (September 30, 1969).
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be protected under the public trust doctrine or some creative
legal theory related to environmental quality.1 9
Finally, if
the conflicting state regulation does not fall within an area
of commerce in which national uniform control is imperative,
the state law may prevail.19
Future expansions of federal programs may be required
in order to handle problems which individual states cannot
control. The extent of these expansions remains an open
question. One likely area of expansion is that of improved
environmental quality. For example, in recent remarks to
Congress President Nixon stated: "Specifically, I propose
a seven-point program . . . to give the states more effective
backing in their own efforts .... I propose that the Federal
pollution-control program be extended to include all navigable waters, both inter- and intra-state, all interstate ground
waters, the United States' portion of boundary waters, and
waters of the Contiguous Zone." [Emphasis added.]...
Ownership of beds is an issue that forces its way into
the discussion of public and private rights in navigable
1 9 9 and United
waters. United States v. Utah
States v. Holt
°
State Bank. clearly indicate that bed ownership is a federal
question and that use of the federal test for navigability is
mandatory. However, placed in its proper perspective, this
mandate has a very narrow area of application. Surface use
is not necessarily controlled by the federal test, unless the
state has voluntarily adopted that rule. Thus, even after
title to the bed of navigable water is determined, the public
may have extensive rights to surface use under state law."0 1
Similarly, state-owned beds may be disposed of as the state
chooses.2" 2 Frequently they are transferred to private owner196. For a comprehensive discussion see Sax, supra note 92.
197. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note 193, at 319; cf. Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
198. 6 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 158, 163-64 (1970).
See also Baldwin, The Impact of the Commerce Clause on the Riparian
Rights Doctrine, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 370 (1963); Comment, Constitutional
Validity of a Federal Reforestation Program for Upper Tributaries of
Navigable Waters, 25 Mo. L. REv. 317 (1960) (possible federal land use
controls).
199. 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
200. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
201. See Authorities cited notes 1, 22, 24-27 supra.
202. Authorities cited note 188 supra.
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ship impressed with a trust in favor of public surface uses."'
The scope of these public and private rights will be developed
in the second half of this article, but it is important to note
that the issue of bed ownership itself only arises when a property claim is made under federal authority. In short, entirely too much emphasis has been placed on the issue of title
to beds of navigable waters."' That issue is now largely a
matter of historical interest. Today the more frequent issue
is surface use, particularly for recreational purposes. This
is a matter of state law.
As will be indicated in the second half of this article
with respect to state tests for public waters, "navigability"
may have outlived its usefulness as a meaningful standard by
which water rights are determined. This is also true of the
federal test for navigability. In the first instance, the test
has been expanded to the point that either by definition or
by application under the substantial-impact-on- commerce
theory, there are few waters indeed that are not subject to it.
A standard that excludes nothing has little meaning as a
"standard." Secondly, all the areas in which the federal test
is applied are areas of paramount national concern. There
appears to be little utility in the continuation of the practice
of extending federal controls over these areas through a
strained interpreation of" navigation" or "commerce. " 2 5 A
more direct approach under the general welfare clause might
be more understandable, regardless of its historical appropriateness. However, "navigability" is so entrenched as a judicial touchstone that its general abandonment seems unlikely.'" 6
203. See, e.g., Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9, 21 (1849); Collins v. Gerhardt,
supra note 122; Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, supra note 109.
204. See generally Johnson & Austin, supra note 121; Note, Water RecreationPublic Use of "Private'

Waters, 52 CALiF. L. REV. 171 (1964).

205. See Trelease, supra note 57.
206. One of the major problems with the use of the term "navigability" is the
resort to history to establish navigability-in-fact. This may no longer be
a problem under the federal test. See United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., supra note 23; United States v. Utah, supra note 1. However,
it is a frequent and substantial problem when an historically-based state
test for navigability is employed. For example, one issue may be the past
history of the stream with respect to log floating. Here you may have
to obtain testimony from persons nearly 100 years old. See Brief for
Dept. of Conservation at 29a (Supplemental Appendix), County Bd. of
of Supervisors for Mecosta County v. Department of Conservation, supra
note 5. Similarly, when the narrow issue of bed ownership is determina-
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On the other hand, in the context of federal restrictions
on state determinations of water rights, the Supreme Court
may be persuaded to allow the states to develop their own
tests-based on navigability or some related concept."' This
issue may become relevant in two situations: bed ownership
and commercial surface use. As already indicated bed ownership vis-a-vis the federal test for navigability has a narrow.
range of application. The federal mandate does not extend
to the determination of other public and private rights. A
clear recognition of this point is made by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Johnson v. Seifert:20.
It is not to be overlooked that the Federal test of
navigability is designed for the narrow purpose of
determining the ownership of lake [or stream] beds,
and for the additional purpose of identifying waters
over which the Federal government is the paramount authority in the regulation of navigation.
Whether waters are navigable has no material bearing on riparian rights since such rights do not arise
from the ownership of the lakebed but as an incident
of the ownership of the shore." 9
Moreover, a comparison of the Appalachian, Holt and Utah
cases indicates that the test applied to bed ownership cases is
the test in The Daniel Ball considered as of the date of the
relevant state's admission to the Union. Michigan, for example, was admitted in 1837.210 Evidence of navigability-infact becomes increasingly more difficult to obtain with the
passing of years. The Court, in other areas of law,2 1' has
not hesitated to abandon rules based solely on historical

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

tive, the federal test as described in The Daniel Ball, supra note 20 may
be controlling. This may in turn require an investigation of commercial
uses of the stream in question during the period of admission to the union.
See United States v. Utah, supra note 1.
See, e.g., United States v. Texas, supra note 1, at 716-17; United States
v. Oregon, supra note 1, at 14. But see Arizona v. California, 8upra note
1, at 595-601.
257 Minn. 159, 100 N.W.2d 689 (1960).
Id. at 100 N.W.2d 694.
5 Stat. 49 (1836); 5 Stat. 144 (1837).
For example, the prematurity doctrine as a limitation on habeas corpus
and other post-conviction remedies continued to have validity primarily
for historical reasons. See McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). McNally
has now been overruled. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968).
See
generally Note, Prematurity Doctrine in Habeas Corpus- A Critique,
1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 345.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

47

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 5 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 5

438

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. V

efficacy. Thus, rights related to bed ownership, perhaps
even rights to bed title in cases in which the federal question is raised, may eventually be determined under broader
state tests of navigability.
The other area in which the Court may arguably allow
the states to develop their own standards for determining
rights in navigable waters is that of commercial surface use.
It was indicated in a well-developed article nearly a decade
ago that recreational uses (particularly boating) might be
expected to impose increasing demands on navigable waters.212 This prognosis has proven valid and would seem
sound if made today with respect to future recreation demands. 13 Demand has exploded as the result of increased
amounts of leisure time and has been stimulated by projects
aimed at expanding the resource base for water-oriented
outdoor recreation. For example, one might point to the
successful introduction of coho salmon into the waters of the
Great Lakes. 1 ' By contrast, traditional commercial traffic
has frequently turned to other forms of transportation. Recreational surface use may become identified as the "new
commerce." In view of the magnitude of the recreational
boating industry and the related supporting services, one
might predict increased federal regulations of recreation
waters under admiralty jurisdiction and the commerce
clause.2"' On the other hand, the following arguments might
persuade the Court that state determination of navigability
and resulting surface-use rights should control. The first
argument is consistent with the common law concept of jus
publicum, that the King could not alienate his trust in navigable waters without authorizationfrom parliament."6 The
original states as recipients of territorial sovereignty from
the King, transferred under the Treaty of 1783,217 acquired
212. Waite, supra note 45.
213. See authorities cited notes 45-48 supra. At the end of 1969, there were
358,546 power-driven pleasure craft registered in Michigan. U.S. DEPT.

OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD, ANNUAL REPORT TO MICH. DEPT.
OF STATE (February 1970).
214. See generally TODY AND TANNER, COH0 SALMON FOR THE GREAT LAKES
(Mich. Dept. of Conservation 1966).

215. See Waite, supra note 45.
216. Commonwealth v. Alger, supra note 13, at 90.
217. 8 STAT. 80 (1783). See generally, Olds, Law of the Lakes, 44 MIcH. S. B. J.
14, 15 (Feb. 1965).
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their navigable waters impressed with the same trust but
open to the same exception in favor of legislative authorization to allocate surface uses. Public domain states have the
same control over inland navigable waters under the protection of the equal footing doctrine."'8 Hence, the states should
be able to develop their own tests of navigability, to determine their own disposition of state-owned submerged lands,
and to regulate rights to surface use, in the absence of some
conflicting paramount national interest in the given body of
water. In fact Supreme Court cases both before and after
Holt and Utah have indicated that the respective states do
have this power as an inherent attribute of their sovereignty. 19 It is only the federal mandate with respect to the
narrow issue of bed title under a federal property claim, as
declared in Holt and Utah, that has caused the confusion.
The second argument is less historical in its orientation and
addresses itself to the broad limitation of "conflicting paramount national interest." The specific question to be answered is what is inherent in the character of recreational
surface uses of navigable (or nonnavigable) waters that
would require national supervision. One author has indicated that increased numbers of pleasure craft will endanger
navigation by larger ships, will increase the volume of accidents between pleasure boats themselves, and therefore will
subject recreational boating to admiralty jurisdiction and
implementing federal legislation."' Similarly, as a billion
dollar industry with an impact on interstate commerce, these
activities may possibly be subject to regulation under the
commerce clause. These predictions are sound, but it must
not be overlooked that state and federal legislation may coexist in the same subject area. 2 1 Moreover, a conflict in
state and federal controls is likely to occur only on the larger
inland navigable waters, ones commonly used by vessels with
significant commercial loads. Here the need for uniform
controls in the interest of interstate commerce seems obvious.
218. See authorities cited notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.

219. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, supra note 1, at 716-17; Shively v. Bowlby, supra note 2.
220. See generally Waite, supra note 45.
221. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note 193, at 318-19. Compare 46

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

49

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 5 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 5

440

LAND AND WATER LAW REvIEw

Vol. V

By contrast, in many states (Michigan and Wisconsin, for
example) there are hundreds of miles of streams that only
have a carrying capacity for light recreational boating.22 2
What paramount national interest can there be that would
require these to be subjected to national supervision? The
recreational uses of those surface waters which are not navigable in their natural and ordinary condition as highways of
commerce, but which are "navigable" and hence subject to
public use only under a state "saw-log" or "pleasure boat"
test, would seem to fall within the range of activities "of predominantly local interest." 22. The solutions to these problems and a clear statement of the extent of this potential
source of federal limitations on water rights under state
law will have to wait until new cases appear. The test, however, was established long ago:
Now, the power to regulate commerce, embraces a
vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly
various subjects quite unlike in their nature; some
imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States
in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity,
which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.2 24
Having developed the federal sowrces of public and private rights in navigable waters, the second half of this article
will consider the scope of these rights under state law.
U.S.C. §§ 527-527h (Supp. 1970), with MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 281.1001-.1017 (Supp. 1969).
222. See, e.g., Attorney General ex reL. Hoffmaster v. Taggart, supra note 4;
City of Grand Rapids v. Powers, 89 Mich. 94, 50 N.W. 661 (1891) (description of the Grand River); Lamprey v. Metcalf, supra note 8; Muench
v. Public Service Comm'n, supra note 109.
223. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
224. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note 193, at 319.
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